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1 1 vr Ml .fc'V-U *'' »*
The e In
b ia In tY t guerrilla varf- ri til 98 it
b;- thi at of large nuffiboi
of amartcan troops, airs 1 • oreovcr,
intensive effort la bei- I d in the politic 1





11 v orient- misent in
a position to undertake the raquisiti curing
rttl, cvoluticr b of :' : outh V5
he Interesting sot of thin cor at is the fact
United ' S forcer at 1 J over Ml
in conjunction with foreign troops which, for the BOfit part
rat an alien culture, different and
ere members of the armed forces of newly ; at I one.
rtb Viet nd. Korea. In addition, the
1ni 8 1 r t i on I pa to be /ting subt 1 ' i
c
luraa on its alii a send forces to aeslat in the
rWSjgla or inereare their oOsSBitaattta , if already involv
The i ant situation ir similar in many iat
. . in the prosecution of the I'oro | r and
o.
ay question 1 a result of joint clliter?
tlon ". litad States forcer end foreign troops of the
aforementioned typo which remain unanswered. For example:
,"
II
Are joint military c 1 frantagaotia to both ...
,
and the nation concerned in the political, econc. m<3
are the I go
of Joint .-tion with
v; effective are joint C ions "ing
the problems Of li
" ininr end ooordi-
I on
ry judgment in r-oot c uld Indicate that
the advant fay outveimh the &1« . -/or, I
believe that c:re:ful lyala of l&atanoa* till ry
ion may provide • Insight into the probl«o». B
. , ult, might revire Iti approach • roid
Laving ehort-run military gain* at thi na* of lor
run achievements enhancing politicrl lity, economic
develop-Bitot i nd oclal Qhanga In an underdeveloped count
r
Ith this in Bind | I decided to
, ,
-
zilian milit ©operation during tforld o, pri-
raarir I of the fr;ct t1 razil in the period 191
19^5 epitomised the underdevelop ,lon I to flex its
clef; on the international r.ceno. In addition, Brazil, by
virtue of its size, population and geographical location
LI moat assuredly exercico : vaeiva influence through-
out the r"outh .American continent in the year? to come, ?h'
in the final analyais, may provide the solution to the problem
plagued the United ^hroug-hout It? hint cry of

lii
tie rolati< 'th our neighbors to the south. The
stolon beinr that of exercising Influence I Kith America
without •• the twin "ecctres of intervention and
EM iolisr i
I aa fi' ' tted to the concept of the
roach" which conceives of the influence, re:* cur ;i&
?y of a nation being directed prlmari.l; re
count ri ~ uh a spinoff Gifting throughout the surrounding
;-8 so that the benefits of our effort
r
ict only
to th Ton directly -"oncorned, but to contiguous areas
and the OV , aa veil. In trie -or, pi etlvtf In
asitive srrrr could be achieved without the rancor and
ophobic reaction inherent in a scatt erst Ion a ah
which, by necessity, invaribly involves the **, '. be eloi
relation 'th the vory small, impotent countries that
have tendency to ever- react to the Imagined threat from
the leader of the international order.
pt at id analysis
of , - rszillan relations in the Period ' ' ly
ceding and during orl Two. ion is focused
on the role of Brazil in isphc-ric defense, the
is threct „ th pons a it evoked, the policy decision to
r "il and the factors influencing' the
decision. phasli la also directed toward the eotuel
mfelitcry cooperation during the war snd a summation of the




It Is anticipated that so rfl to the ur : ions
previously posed may be provie trail orae profound
insight into the problems od by the !.. ', in
ont Itfl policies during tl riod in
question
Unfortunately, I encountered soma difficulty with
clcs rifled BOttroai concerning the record of the
odition-r.7 Force. Cne rource previously ©1 led due
rks that could b " d derc y,
if viev/ed v.'ithout objectivity, vbly declar:«rlf icd.
In any care, a thorough ex on of tl: v: il-
ia provided some indication of the role of , '.-.,
lie not fully based on official records in suffici
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In any consider ^lon or pc li-
the prieery element for initial on. b be that of
the to be c ed in the d if? position I of
rll resoure.es for the it of national .-
to. .eel emever, USA divided the national
resources for at ret eric ptirpoaea into the followin oriee:
litleal, econ'n-ic, hosoelal ( >,lnstlon of payohO*
lorical ana" ideolorical) . lilt ry. In the United
:tee, ly prior to, taring 'crld V.Pr Two, all
r of three "oriee were employed in the Btl y for
the defense of the aataftt Hemisphere.
The enphaeis on total hemispheric defense planning V;
rked by tii dch crisis of 1 ..id indicated o shift
in strategy from the previous policy of :; fort;- merles"
defense. i continente.1 type defense nly alter-
native left to the fflilit«ry planners due to the lack of
adequate u.:~. military forces to enforce the .Monroe Doctrine.
This new national policy, as recognized by Franklin D.
1. -nest Dttpuy, and Trevor '.lltary Herjt
01 1 ca ( ork: ill orr.pcnv, 11*6).Wn yw . w . * W W W V
2. Ibid., p. 456.
:"
.a •*
t I '. *" "
: |M
Roosevelt, rehired the friend! fl ctivr -ort of all
3the or 3. o a net i one •
.'ith th< national $ I era
t in their mine", Joint
pi - on prll 21, 1 $9 stll hioh pro-
vided th bIs for t ic
timing concerning the Atlantic situation. In thil report,
thev concluded that the Axis powers would initial!
if til Hit an intensive eeoaos&e penetr tion of Latin America
uld be followed bv politic,! interf or one o r.o as to
der the area vulnerable to foreign dOttination, Thence,
th latabliah military baser. The firrt objective
•jlc pro- 1 be the Metal area on the eastern hulre of
ith subsequent attacks apainst the Fan Canal
thereby interdicting the | it of U.T. naval power.
The report roved which provided the re- d for
detailed war plant to protect the fcara viere.
ted t inbow pi i .
I inbow Ont provided for the protection of all United Btattt
territory and t inder of the tsphere north
of a line bisao&laj I eritS jur.t below the Peruvian/
llian bulges, (Ouarter-sph }. inbow ' nd
3. Stetron Conn and Tyron -: irchild, Th- ; o-.:or-c of
i__
.__, 'United State " in florid ./ar II,
1. 1, The astern - ' sphere. 2 Vols,, in prccc
'
-ton, D.O#l
' Chief of Ml lit 'irtor ,
ent of the Amy | United Stat ov emir: ent Printing
Office, I960), p. 5.
n* ai
-
3Three provided for t" ^tive vicen inter
in the ..est era Pacific. Inl ow Four provided for total
defence of the Western He 3, inbow live
predicated on the basis of act: on li e,lend
and ze. In '-ion bo fulfilling the requi] of
Rainbow One, it conte : % ed the ov< ive of
by O.S, forces.
In order to 3 "ent the IP in lal One
rticuler, It was 1 tive that bar -i lit ion for
U.S. us6 be obtained on t vasilian hulre in the 1
necer oint of the army to
forest? 11 the possibility of the requirement for wajor
effort to dialer eis forces, the t of which
would be precluded by prior tf, . occupation with
Ion, eoreover, aircraft it rer; ae
Hat, subject to ace- : orces free:
the intervening i s lends.
The nc.vy woe. anxious for th at in tb in
order that t of the continent could be
carried out, zilian lend force; c not ed
in Northeast Hrezil, Additionally, ; i land, 9
^* ~-n
-













ton, ",. " .: Offie ' I ' .ory,
t of the An t Pri
ire ice, 1?6D), pp« 7-10.

4and air forces in 1939, cr i inc. pable of effectively
isting a determined exter: » AH h the
es represent «i critical requirement for pi
icn, it J t three year:: before per-
: ion could be cbt; ined to station U.S. forces in the area?
In lay 1940, Hitler mc.r on the rampsme in Europe and
it appeared as if our. conclusions concerning the .'xis
in Brazil uere fast becoming reality. The army planners,
in the light of previous planning and the American
military forces available, concluded that activities, for
. a year, would have to be limited to offensive-
defensive action in South America to defend our interesta,
The recommendation *raa mace that efforts be concentrated
in the South American area to preclude occupation of the
opean possessioaa in the hemisphere and to forestall
German movement into .Bra si 1.
To implement these rocommendotiens , the I*avy drafted
the plan "Pot of Gold' 1 which en; :' C sending to Frazil
10,000 troops bj sir to be followed by 100,000 troops by
sea, in the event of an emergency initiated by Ax is move-
nt toward South America. The plan -orovided for the use
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of the , " int-
inc Office, I960), p . -13,

5of four battl . ' , nine cruisers, i
of dftr' ' : 131
.
ir -.-tlned for Morthec : t 11 with
the h fOrO« ' tiro, Of cotirrc,
-ilitier for e ant by all . oil
id navy for . However, the rcope of
the tnlttg ir lndifl tive of the key role thi t Br-zil
yad in United t ..tes g»l
1th the Fall of France in • une I'-AO, the tion,
itsrlly, : critic:! necerr.it;. tin? new decisions
concerning- h 1 aerie defense, Tr evident Roosevelt
approved • Joint ten ndum of the Chief of ytsff .nd.
ief of y v, 1 Operations which provided for the follow*
inp:
a. Occupation of European post**6ten* in
the Western Hemisphere in lias to prevent
carrion to Germany after consultation
with the ..ineric- v ublicr.
b. qm for c tion of stj ic
ribbea i, outh and Central American
possessions when provided for by negotiation.
c. The utilization of United at at es armed
forces to support existing goveminent as
required*
d. The supply of munitions to latin American
countries at intervals and the granting of
credits for their purchase.
6, t% ' kinner at son. ' .-. ff : : ; g j r . . ns
a.' - ^: r tions , (VoT7 1, K nit ad
in • y-r- Defense, 6 Vols., The 'cr Department
,
in proceas, . .: I. toria 1 yivirlon,
I rtffient of the , U. " ; . Government Printing
yfice, 1950), p. 96.
.
e. The economic i it of United States/
Latin American economic relations.*.
In H ice, t - iditicnr, provided 'd -is
for cur policy in rs I 'lean
coc "ion 'ion of her;''' e
throughout the wi
The fundamental objective of thi Btr< in fel
Atlantic I : 3, fir:'. : nd I" orenort , Unit ed it 1
defence, which in turn * Ion of the
\ima Canal, ,c en urc .' a, reliinc
virtue of sal n tion
of .t,ion, aero-:- th Lis of
the South Atlantic to Africa, In ',' ' , the "nited
as the anchor for i misting of th4 canal*
Brazil renoh feet frtoi . %j have
rendered useless the stj - nd pi .;ori:.u~.
later .Oyed, which led to the successful conclusion of
the war* Fortunal il did not prove to be that
link, although for 6 lengthy period, wa bad DU? floubte,
IL





Latin htlch Included (1) t ' .at ion of the
~i thre t 3f subversion
, (
' rio unity,
7. Conn and. dairchild, The nrk of de.,1 l_c
Defense , Vol. 1, The dertorn Hemisphere,
-qv* 3o-39.

7(3) maximum utilization of the defence capability of 3rez.il,
(4) politi tability, (5) the use of r-trategic base* and
(6) the full use of et rat agio resources. & In short, tho
objectives were aimed at eiisur'. i« wholohe.:.rt I d support
of U.S. policy in the prosecution of the war, but stopping
short of requiring their sending forces overseas. This was
primarily a result of the fact that United States arris
production, initially, couldn't meet the demand of our CW8
forces. Brazilian ant production •/ Imoet negligible,
so any equipiemnt required would have had to come from the
U.S. Later in the war, this proved feasible under the Lend-
-:S.
The threat of foreign subversion was Initially
recognized in two areas: that of economic penetration and
the predominance of Axis airlines throughout Brazil. t
the Havana Conference, 194-0, the necessity for countering
German influence in trade w; - cognised as an immediate
objective. 9 German commercial penetr- tion had been sub-
sidized through compensation by the Reich which allowed
German merchants to undercut United States prices 10 to 40
8. U.S. Centres-, cncr,e, Committee on Foreign Relation*
,
"ost orld Ssr II Politic 1 S>velor>~ent in Latin
Atrieri sa~ 86th "onr-:., 1st sess., Senate Rent. No. 1,
'.-•'. iiinrton, l' ; S9), p« 29.
9. "Havana Conference of 1940, :I foreign Belie;
,
or 15, 1940, p. 136,
:: 1
8percent. ^0 Busln* I] ere receiving c 1
order ar export prices, icn relected
t of t rids -buyinc at lower and i tiling at
higher prices. Since ec .ic penetration first
p, States policy h o be directed toward its
r educt i on
.
The pervasive influence of the Axle airlines
point
r
wrought to light b] article in te , i on in
7, which pointed out the extent to which the ' .'
air transportatlea I loailnated "by airlines, either
rated i firms or laeir controlled by th' .
This was significant ai or in the economic penetr: tion
of Brazil, but of more importance the feet that the
control of tl as enabled G iy to sxercire 11
influence in lilt enee by mapping 11, controlling
the training of national pilots end conducting
reconnaissance in the event of war* I reasons,
reduction of this threat to an acceptable level v;e a one of
the first priorities.
Hemispheric unity was essential for the solution of
the problem of ling the hemisphere, Oeorgraphy couldn't
be altered, therefore it o be ittt bed into a a stem
>able of sustaining the shocks of a major war thr« t aning




9not only the western continent, but oeraey &11,
The defensive capabilities of "'razi~ o, for i 11
purposes, strict! U , -d to dej v« action
in the industrial south which alss included 1
of fo. . ainorit sups* Th- ' as






ail's a: one of the lar • g In
.
, but poorly sqiil] " dlltary
attack, .: :: \ 11, consisting primarily of
coastal defense ships wit; capital ' > of ancient
vintaye. President Vargas in oo ; on th • navy
red to it a a anachronic .
Lac* brazil was fch« i "tone of the i h 1spheric
defense in the -tlaiitic, 1 Vital to th« 1
mission of protecting the : r straits, a act Of the
diplomacy until 3 iterec. the war, was directed toward
achieving the use of bases. other objectives, in:
azil was concerned, were relatively easy to obtain
under the threat of war, but the 1 ion intent 3
h the question of rover air i1 . ' lly true
in Brazil all as the remainder of Latin America, far
the fear of intervention regained strong 61 during the
war when tr -eculation that the : uld not be
vacat en they a- ere no longer needed.

10
political stability under the r ine was a
relative^ robi em ill our relations, for h- been
in power since the revolution of 1930, Although pressures
were oft - orted in o.n effort to remove hi in ice,
one being an armed attack on his life, none were successful
until after the war. In fact, tec" the Inte-
list (Fascist) movement in 1737. ed forces
in power, but trice. :o influence him \ lust
the Allies, ie question of ,/hich way ho would shift wasn't
wored until 1942, although previous inci ere that
he would favor th Lee,
The policy of obtaining access to the storehouse of
str erials loca'e in Bf vital
importance as the way pro ed, for sources of supply for
terials auch I Lea, quartz crystal,and rubber- v;ere
controlled by the Ja s.
In the pursuit Of these policy objectives, it was
realized that durable Goo; lghbcr relations were ii ibli
except on a reciprco sis. Therefore, the attempt was
de during the war to reciprocate for Brazilian support,
the success c: .h c i be measured by the achievement cf
all our policy objectives as well as by the joint r.ilit-






- a reflect I on of 1 re
thin th« here Ina1 r "ing
11
It : . . The Unit record ten .in
in thli : r - : ' s not th t, nol I ged
oi-'E, or of
GUI'- I. i .'OS
n : ly to aegis
I ine. -.-re ir. a
oi tii lei .
Cur ch c-tic relation .: the
hbor Po2 rlor to
r Two, At the Seventh Inters once in
. I :• in 1933 1 one unl':. .ates BUJ the right
of Intervention, i ;. artant end little noticed
13
reservation. fa t ion, elded I ll£
to ret;.:. in the right of intervention in ceres of
dispute wherein tl cui by the rules
14
of International law.
11. John I, '.loch, " Qhal3 few
: : oreign Folic- "on. 1 -C), p. 7.
12. Duncan Aikn&n, The oil- Air eri con Front , ( kj
Doubled..-/, ooran and Coupon;-, inc., l?4l) t p. 7.




. 1 ;C- ), p. 6.
14. iolo-;otlc l:.l"tor,7 of "he United
tee rth ed., o./ orkj holt , nhinehart and










Inod tor ether to dilute tB
til to pro otp i united front, I ut did to
provide for e -"ion V a stipulation for the Ing




donectlo polltier. tr-Hc.o / oe wer .
~
IrreepanelbllJ In the
1 coir :pq devoid of en;- real
>e«
or, In difficulties in our diplomatic
sne, each conference ee prevalent in
,
for tl % fey th hbor
pel , he fear of : v. 'nation,
need : .nt o.;-er Milted itlon, 9
sharpened th- In - ns or ' 1
ace to their northern n or. In It ion to the




pert"; ifc"" 1?: Tal i 0), p. 3.
.
13
renunciation f intervention, th Id
purity provided thi a Pan- nien,
T
.»
rere i I of ; ir
ina
';!•• on offi IIey of
neutr ann
3«nJ 10*6 -. l'V-0 -2.
In the • .' , lit
world
ir .




Lth the ' vy
,
Thi sk of '
nee t LJboa of
i of oonl l o, ^
In contract, G- IIan mi lit- active
roufhout Latin - ly in Brazil, for they





. :ce thi A:is aci.ionr aid r ve to labor "under
an trii achila, xhj 'z of
e, p. 267.
!7. _id., P. 173.
.'
14
the h ;-ip of ,ia history a lt<3 the
Uni . I3itianally | -.a.- or re
le --u.it ed for the I.-rgt
d in ">ing t
.. in 2 conv
of
i . An of thi tj ,he
or training in the
.
. Ln
of sdlit p ubli cations to mi ; rerles Bind
'.
: out - " I fe i on
,
i to actively promote the sole ,0 Latin
i ,
r. in ^ In it ion in 3r*sil,
extent k a invitation to General I edro AtsdllG ont.oiro,
n chlof 01 tin.
ped t .. si t of i
. the head of • cr<- ck re :; , hile
General ... flatter* an
.id ere : --, ned
of tb Ltation U 3 Ottt -"' i &• a
vie it to the United rtctcc . In fact. t
:;.l and l or, 'turn






with hir en- nit ed States ' ip. Gene 11
to ; 1 on the light cruiser llle,
arriving on '-, . In mid- ro
-1 General
i 9 of vi it ;
j
--hile not ao r.uch
, ion, b - o for
Ion "be .
The outorc I ie Eur : i novics-
t 3 ttblice to COC "eh was
spe-. into cation at th«
nana on September -3. i ! • b. important
resolutions adopted at tlv con:.' ting a
it around b) ice
oi 1 d miles* erican
.moLiic i Lnanoial Advisory Cojamittea -n
be to discus a am recomman bu e t Vie
Stresses in economic life B&USSd bj t> ] , 20 A thll
olution provided for — in case Of i b ing
e e) in sovereignty of a E&irope&n pot ion in the
to ih r .
olution led to th nfi at < July, 19^0
ioh confirmed thesna-tranafer principle by
olution for acting in concert, to occupy crn ,- prary
baait colonial no, ions c en- riean power, if
19. The P lines bapafeine , bay 22, 1939,
20. Lawrence Duggan, The -u: ericas; The Cearch for ber.isnhere
purity
,




threatened by any other non—American power. In at
,
concern was being direo itlsh, J. ranch and Dutch
in the event of i i threat to eeiza th« .
In :' olut ion on collective
act Of < ' Lnet one is ck
In ' til) and •.."reed to meet to decide defensive
asure .
The neetir id the rer olut ions arreed upon were
vital, not only to the United States, but p^rt,.'. culrrly to
u nd ef e ndeai : r ri zil. Brazil, facing the : outh nt-ic
and with e long coastline w: rticularl ?'useptible to
submarine wc-rfare. The European possesslona which were
using the moat concern were contiguous go brazil on the
northeast which waa a loo undefended. If the area fell into
unfriendly hands, the promotion of internal subversion would, in
conjunction with foreign minority elements In the .'outh, prove
to be a difficult problem to cope with. However, the
icn republics in support of one another at Panama end
Havana had provided the diplomatic basic for further action
in the protection of their national interests. The Pan-
Americanization of the bonroe Doctrine had now been completed
the conversion of a unilateral policy to a nu.l~.i- lateral
igction. ^
21. Dorothy Burne Coebel, ed., .':- e ic-n Foreign Policy
Documents
,
(New York: Holt, hinehart one .'ins ton, 1961),
P. 267.




Le there c ' diplomatic front
-
1
. ee, the millt eollal 'on be. .11
lited still had not reached t b
ful defense of north- eil could be
sic lly, the problem revolved around a conflict
between the desired polley of stationing U.S. forces In
Brazil -nd. the Brazilian policy of refraining from
permission, relying Instead on protecting t v-ith
their own force* plied by the
Surplus coast defense ered to Brazil
in 1°39, moat of it obsolete, whlsh ©I : ec the Braziliani
ce the- were interested in obteinin pone.
During l'Al, the United uccessful in
obtainin n weapons for 11 than in providing u. .
pons. ns pure!: had previously be se by
Brazil in Germany ore in the process of being I hipped
in a Brazilian vessel, the alquiera Campos, when they were
22intercepted by the British* General Sfershsll int sd
nd Obtained pe ' ion for an eerie- n Bhip to lead the
in Li ebon for transshipment to Brazil. The amount of
arms involved was not really significant , end s ince the U. .
couldn't compensate for the inability of Brail1 to obtain
German arms, the weapons supply problem exasperated U.S. -
Brazilian relations.
Brazilian - U.S. staff agreements were negotiated with





all in 1°40 pre - for lucre sec
In the event of i -• . to
rpress alien activit; to it or
. prt 1 to develop
urtry and railr n the
fori: of , **
In Jul,.-, l'V*l, the staff agreements hoc :e
Brazilian-/,:".- .-Trie >I»t Pianni" | vst ich provided
for a joint purvey of the northecet anc pi-, nninc for eaeh
nations contribution? to Ita eefenre. ions
:lled out specific- that • threat heel to he r ized
. th t ce of the 0, , -evlO be for the
placer periods as die "/lea. - orcover, th
would rcnain under .-.rezllian 6 .id with D*S« ftrtti B
Laforo &••**
It c -.:n j ly be er- ined that even at th te
1, there regained the fear of intervention by
. ., I though the cooperation in other areas had bo
MIOmotU • . Brazil h proved the construction
of eight military base?, financed by U.a. funds and had
rted to move its own armed for I o the northeast for
atection of vital installations. In June, 1941, approval
23. Conn irchlld, ork of Uen.lrph
277.
24. I , >90,
.
was Obtained for l. , of the "victor- ' and
th=
I . .
In October, 1 -U, int ;. ii.'. :>d
11 I ch in i I t ion on
'
,




. he norther ct.
.
c, the u. . I in fcl LiSttiDg







oelled for Rtc d< .no in January
,
: ?tion e r : ult ion,
&«tlng resulted In U3 * 1 bi| rrl. tions
th the Axil int outlining for ifflprovlng
ric def< , in to fel tive
ourccs for Bratu&l bene.'"/, .
iouol;
,
/Hi; r I 'ied •
"hich r cted an ldeo2 *lnlty of the
fovo ( s } with t" n dictatorships*
i had hindered the unreserved cooperation with the I'.'".




- 1 ittt in a
po lanolng 11
This ^orc soisprc ' at the Rio con: c© as

20
the U. , on promotlr of
: ions to bloc j ch
entina.
"re- nded" - reak ic
Ions, thereby unanimity, lag the
United oroviciri; on to %fa
auld | ermy off! of th'
untry. ^
In March 1942, the Uni' Pftftii negotiated
\ rreenents or. bodied in diplomatic notes nnd
contracts. In the agr«« ~ures of
econor
'
nee provided for, m new lend-
I agreement sailing for deliver oh
lue of ','200,000,000 which double the rmount pre-
iely crrenred for in l°4l. Concurrently, I
•
ed
to deliver 100 .niediu'
,
ore than 200 light fc&ntee,
fifty ocnbftt aircraft, antiaircraft X gnn» #**
The economic provided for th tion
of roil ; ourcc; providing '1£DO,000,000
for the purpose. A ;--5,000,000 fund 9 by the
dubber Reserve Sea
,
ent ftgenay) to be used
in collaboration with the in the
ion of rev; rubber production. The la ft it
25. Hubert Herring, ;'i:-.torv o :' .-. tin >r.erica From
"inning To Present , ' :;.: ork: Alfred --. dnopf, 1061),
,806.




r03P the devel it of Iron mis ad railroads
in *-^«27
of tl: d the
11
for the ' ;0 onnel
into northeast Brazil. Shortly thereafter. X *42, a
rican defense Sffit v; coinciding
with the fundi 1 eh la « * r policy. The pol:'
d shifted fror: the promotion of measure- to place U,:-.
troops I 11, to one rtlne II "ion of
' Ilan fo: e.rppor ,8, in the
form of training/ ial.
In June 1942, Hitler decided on I hing
Ing off the northeast ell.. In the
pros --cut ion of there at' , gov 'era 1 hrazllian ;r©
sunk nit 3 of life. 11 countered eith a
Men of o coops- rat ion %h been covert
now h overt. The threat of the axis to .11 had
now become a reality thereby for~iri£ the bonds of mil'
to last throirehout t r.
27. David II. Popper, ' t •- - reslllan -oor-ds
of ;;• rch 3. i?^, 17
"
: sy ' pert", I roh 1 ^2.

Chapter II




JTY of FEE THE
In the thirties, Hitler In a cor tion with one of
hit on the question of Brazil atated
shall create a new G : there, o shall find everything
we need there. "^ Questioned fee to the method for obtaining
control of Brazil, he replied, " fefe shall not land troops
$ Willian the Conqueror and. pain Brazil by the Strength
of or
.
Cur weapons are not visible ones/'p The Fuhre-r
referring to the sethode for ' n objectives
wh t ch w er © a 1 r liable to hi r •
.
I Brazil, mountains of coffee were rotting on the
, United State* balances were blocked en<3 it on
bonds were ended indefinitely. The traders had
doubled their share of the Brazilian market, meetly at the
expenee the British, 3.; n colonies were in exist-
ence in "outhern Brazil, German controlled airlines were well
established end the geveraaeiat of Varg 1- -cist In
form. Lie these opportunities existed for the imposition
of Axle domination, and they were exploited to the fullest
extent, count ermeasures by the United Statee due to the early
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attacks didn't r f**08J this fear until after the
oved into North Africa, thereto
possibility of direct military action.
the
The reality of/threat was forcefull; >j ught home to
the si liana when the Allies attacked Africa, for the
Brazilians had "been expecting bombere and troop planes from
of
the African coast. 11/horthern Brazil had been on alert,
the Brazilian artsy nning the beeones and il
ancient battleships, not fit for Bee dut , Wl towed
into position at the harbor entrances in Baia and 1 to
provide protection."
arever, the milit i fc -v t never be< Lit ,
due pri: to planning and i at ion before the fact by both
the United States and Brazil. ifficult problem to
cope with waa the threat from within sc Offensive sures
re required rather than defensive, which according to the
military tacticians requires greater effort: .
ES
One of the most dangerous influences in Brazil, in the
ars prior to the war, v,ras the network of axis and a:is
contrdHed airlines. lines established la the late
'ales and ^cre well entrenched alng it difficult for
Loan Airways to lent theft, 1°38, Pan-
6. rd T online on, Battle for the Hemisphere , (New 'ork:
i
"B-, lnA7), p. 96.
t.
•^an w I , but held s poor
re in
jentzv-l Soutfc if . TV i 't
corrected until the eve of f n I .
ion of
eon , •?
tm tion litlan d in - a
on the -ir mode of ti i Ion t : . &4
oonti , "were in * to
ax&*#, aoq\dr« ooti
wit $ • to provid ;- the
formation 01 in th . f the
rout 3..intpined into interior ' "eh
ion and a
lOSB, This ' ;C
litsry and payo Lui l*rf ? therefrom*
In general, the Axic airli fOultf ' Tied in
three :-ier. : (1) and It: 'I
'oh vm • of their r uta, (2) the
lrlJ jjolioj
controlled >: he Uiftha: n.
&r, a oamouflagsi offshoot o
tlw 1 ad receiving 3ra*illa» govar
subsidy,
'
7. I olvin H&ll falt< Pol
Horse/' -oreirn .-iff? l r. , l'^l.

te Condor, th i airline in ::outh -nieric;
,
the tion of
co. th plete into
nort: ao. the staff
d or aatui , at
con on tri-notoz r),
Uttkai I - . If
Lo Condor . LwfthftlM ..;.. thf r
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ncident involved L.A, „
(itaXiftll Line, t o.ife r.ii'. even hours
to on :vm destination on e fl" pretext. 1^ The fine of
10). rtter F"f< --Intrigue on the o,"
>rtune . Juxu te«
11» Ibi C .
, p.
12* H? 11 ©ok, »o," a_£,
iu©ry, 1941, p. 350.
13« ' i Gunther,
.;. ^
;-.4f.".
. (He orttj H roor
an' there, 1)41), p. 3P'\
'
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01, COO war hardly sufficient tc ent similar i
ver t' i aotivit'
inc- d. it is perhap , alt
inci - . . rQ iyiui were
detrl 1 to .. .
'Mon that t Irlin- he
grr . o
wee
counteract ir influence 'hi
n
9t the British allowing ~L. .to operate
not i their of oil
Oro (i a
tacit in return,the Germans \ inue
to allow the l r!1 loo to &!**
•loin, r. . ired to . Lent the
German linei throughout r;outh .' reluctant
coope- ith the United States government Is fort a
for erasui n influence. X1 ft-
l pan owned 84 percent of B0*41 bia) which
connected with Condor in Brazil, and w&i c
tbi -t to exercise operating control, it v.,
only after la .Ive ci fort r: by fcl r
that 'ifled. incident ly
the meet :" .it instance of i bee eorporatlcn
er 1^4-1), P. 36$.

29
refusing to -import governmental policy during the period
under c one i deration, "
Concerted action began to be applied i or removal of
the Axle influence in I°38. The first positive measure in
19^0 Imposed nationality requlremente on the German staff.
In July, 1941, Condor and LATI were placed on uhe blacklist
by the U. . :overnment . Pan-Amerloaa vice * - substituted
for th n Lines that were nationalized. aowever, the
I | 3 i service >;as unable to expand fast enough, .imericans
ill taking all the available :e and the United
reluctant to sell ] raall new planes and parts
which coui s compensates. ior the Inability of Pan-
ic
American to completely replace the German service.
Soon after Pearl harbor, there were no Axle owned
irlines in South America. Condor, nationalized shortly
thereafter, continued under the direct orship Of . rnesto
17Hoelck, a German sympathizer. It Wasn't until Brazil
entered the war in 194-2 that all vestiges of Axil control
hed disappeared.
In retrospect, the removal of ail. airlines from Brazil
iony, arduous task which with persistence w.; s finally
accomplished. The U.S. managed this in time to prevent a
serious danger by acting £ gainst a potential vice real threat,
15. % , :.'-:'- ^is g I -rch for i sphere
Security . ( lew ork: Henry Holt and Company, 1"49), p. 85.
16. "Dynamite in South ..merle ," he aew ""ork Tim - - "sine ,
t ember 7, 1942, p. 96.
17. Ibid ., p. 96.
.
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since feh r of -
not of r sonstitufce a ser' naoe.
Lnin te ; " in t
ion la ' ©d 6 frori
tvrc ":. fly -t I v hat 3C istitut
they
-.ond th t/th th
the truth probahly 3G»«f - in betv:oen.
- view that conatitut eel a . - - v.r ere
dlr ducin- or to a level aoc€ t# to
both :'. ort v . re. zi 11an societies,
ns looked ^o;rt, hvc-rd. , th f
BUbrersl " dug e I 3 ie thri io
broad | • -;i:-t prog - burr i .ubsidizing Latin
i news i bein i\ Is
to :;erk for th« c: ion o: oiat pro
creating political unrest through tfc I b ' ihment of Pa-sel
OV#tt«nt . I the sttbversiOl
conduct* the t t ion ic
penetration ctrlnatlon of army o: let
Ideas through sill ' nd study pro -urooe. "
18. [man, The .-.ll- ic-.-a ^ront t (New York}
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in rurul ai ' numbers on
"in, as colonists under t< y n of ce. e-ions
directed by t: nese Got -it.
ie nov : I











all j 3 ! ong; the Amazon " s the
nit of - zlllan~ fapanet 9 1 Llcfcfcing f:
one-hslf million acres in the .nn?-on basin for the est • blieh-
t, of ciuasi-in&epen&er Jconomie : r/ ; polltioal entities
ec, i©e« oolonlsts, Coloniaatlon, thus bee
ubstitution for laok Of tatfHMtttflHt e 1 t
24
of penetration,
irea, " ! inaaoeaellble, -r-
vlsion of their aotivltioi ''iffioult, but a
30 of di tic relations with the Axis in 1942 ( the
azillan oovanusant ao west action by th --nese
inimical to the state, *!on-naLur'\lised : ' >r#
srreeted, settlements garrisoned with troc
boat ted in their movei . Me • at
23. itein, ''rt'zll Under ' . 177.
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26. Low in, . :- 1
j 5r Vargas , pp, 32-33
.
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objectives. In addition, this action in~t
la Internal rebellion and entailed ' ve
.sure ,
The : Mia German colonis d to
llianize them, although harsh in nature, were r : ther
loos el enforced i The measurer included the mandatory
instruction in the Portuguese language in the rur- 1 schools,
indoctrination in ilian hist or government,
limitations on the numbers of foreigners in one locality
and foreign language publications had to have prior gpvern-
27
ital approval. Many more restrictions of a similar nature
were promulgated with the same objective, that of removing
the thre t from the est. blir' roups of foreign elements
in Brazil, before external influences could act in concert
Vita them to subvert the exist ing government.
review of the problem of minority gr< U the
measures t ':en, whether in response to the interns 1 political
situation or to external Influence, rev e Is that by 1939
the efforts of the Gerr nd Italians to use their
nationals in the promotion of their objectives in Brazil
were a failure. 28 The political stability of the Varrar.
regime enabled him to maintain a complete control over
27. Lowenstein, Jrazll Under p_, pp. 189-3L90.
28. Dlffy, "Some "creign Influences in Contemoor ry








'>vor::: rfcivi 4 ll&ed in
eerned s at the :
power. as, is ch on De 30, 1 >41, rep«t#<
thfct "if my loo 1 I
will «at them alive." Othlng could
' illustrative
of the confidence of the Varj overrun ent tc he
nee- -urer for preventing, iitstilt
internal rebellion in conjunction with a military ok
from abroad,
Jhl e threat to the .'estorn
recognized public! ':lin Del elt in June,
19^0 . II ounced that B M of coc
action, by the Anaarloan republic rejected in
order ht be provided against "si
economic aggression b ina of r boar, raonet
controls i no" I ,50
This public aoknOVlsdgSMSt of the ionic
throat in Lot in America Oocurr* tins when the regime
h. France wascoioouered i ritailt
on th ~ive, with ri in
Sjb, Tin I o _ .'. ht
i-ohn Cunther, Ir.
-'JL, (No:-.' orki nd
o, l^-fiTT,,, 307,
30, It -Iron I n o. Seroggs, The
in brio .-ff-lre: -n .-.co- '..nt of . .. -rlcon
."orr.lpn 1 tlons
.
1 7;0 (y<v.-.- . or k
:




is S .' v. the
1$ 9f
ut
The German economic t had bean for: for
a 1 - e in rticv
the 1930 'a
«
nlfeetationa of their actlc
on tho ©etablleha««rt or the airliner throughout the rrer,
attention to wl /c been firawn by their nilH
sipnifio rice, lrno.--t I
innocuous in ch-rrcter, ere the Oth of economic
.i nee itc eoonorslc etr
Th- ieted of It b m of
foreign invert: ent, loaatf, the m in
managerial positions, th« acquisition , nd
ants, -11 of v;hich become ; ic
warfor ~n the intent li to exercise control <:
count r- ,
In 11, the Germans hi ' inv<:. A in
manufacturing;, sericulture . nd el ce while the Unit*:
b een 1nt erStted in pub1 :! c u1 1 111 i <e S the
coffee , ric n interest in th t
areas proved to b-- | nee in latap United
ions due to the fact! of coff
31. Gee- . Lincoln, t& ononins oi ' - Monsl :':ecurit;- ,
Liffa, .".., "---11, Inc., 1°L^ )>
p. 531.








in Brazil's trade i ic reaction to forei
In snt In public utilities, where n pattern
of investment had several beneficial effects.






i d in t ontrol of di tribution ;ti port -Import
firms such as that of ~cr ill*, the number one coffee
exporter. ^ J oreover, powerful industri rel&l
houses had been I bill -1, sxamplrs of which were ti:
following!
Chimic: .- 'Han subsidiary of I. G.
rber industri
Ghimica "; erck" Brasll - A subsidiary of
. .-. rck of ( ay
Ola "onrtructorc Steel Offl i
Frabrica Gunther l«f
These fir' - ; re en 6 in making large financial
contributions to tlv: ad front groups for
es-pion? nda . In addition, in promotion of
German business interest, they supported the formation of
"lnt< criados" (vest ed interests) that exerted
formidable political end economic on the
Bra 2 i 11an Gov ernm ent . *
German commercial poli. listed in the penetr tion
of Brazil through the ure, not only of higher prices for
33. Fortune , November, 1942.
34. The New " ork Times , January 12, 1945.
..
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lien exports, but fey toll iter "its
(in effect B free exfl et } , far better credit
©J - .i ov - ;•;
which could be spent only in \ , sol al
orders for ad cotton?^ Moreover.
her colonies in World r I n
in th: t she was no longer considered an
•rlalist n tion as Was the- United Stat
It of tlv
, total tr is
had increened from 192^-1932 to 1935-193T at an
annual r to of appro.' i£ht million dollars. '
il, being an are., of pri
rtidpant in the t increase, importin o,,
tools, cutlery, machinery, railr' . cheralccl ol
'ieap r tc urn i rt ; r agreements for coffee,
cotton, tobacco, cacso and rubber, Altto - ofit ble in
the lone-run, •Be lied to .at ever E By
nted. to sell at Germany's price.*"
i tr* 9 tern with the Axis wasn't shifted until
the period -19^0 the !c-r in Etarope began to
inhibit Germany's ability to provide ~oods tc r il in




-i' •'.:. i .
villa, Florid University of Florida 3 r?9),
37. Ibid., p. ' .




exchange for her Imports. In th< i % " >rlor tc
,
the
Unite:" on importia -36 percent oG Brazil 1 !
total e: upplylng imports of froa 23-33
percent. C i 3 rtinr 17*19 per
Brazil r nd suj n Vy 19*24 nt of her imports
tod, thereo holding second place in the
trade of - 1 1 . 1940,
; 6 of the *rar, ' 8 the seventh most
"39
Important su r and et fo- il. ever, the
total trade figures while reflecting a reduction in trade,
do net li te th ' : I ce of this trade to German? in
support of her war effort ' is were still
b ei rt ed
.
The following firur re illustrative of not only
the reduction in total trade, but the continued reliance of
Germany on ' a source of ruppl .
orts to Germany 193° 4o
Lard 02. 78.26$
Rubber 25.7- 19.96$
ol , - 7A3%
A similar comparison utilizing some s-trateric products
e, Induetria] sonde, end quarts
crystal cl indicate the extent of the repl it of
40
Germany by the United States a arket for Brazil,
• Brazil , 1940-1941 , Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
VV^ 338-339.
40. Ibid., w. 338-339.
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In 1°A 1, C It el B | o still
fforts in 1 to obtain for Current
and reserve use, even to v -tent of using bio
run uartz ei ' . Indu imonde
were still being %i . .T.T., t enormous cost,
itaIn th« •• - - of th -•• i industry.
The f i commercial houses which had < into
contracts involving penalty clauses for ncsv-performanee,
-e still lag fees for non-delivery and conoludll
contraate in spit* Lhe British blockade. moreover
,
41Gerrm qoj ions were maintained intact.
Tb^ 'nece were still pure strategic materials
for stockpiling and maintaining their highl; organised
mining and purchasing facilities for quartz, tantelite
42
and mica.
It wasn't until tb rine attacks on illan
shipping, t | nese attack on Pearl Harbor and the
ec oneiric strangulation of Brazil due to the loss of her
ropean markets, thst the enormity of the Axis threat
wa s fu 11 ' S canow 1 ec r. eC. I no. c omp 1 et e so ©p era t i on in the
economic sphere wss undertaken to counteract it. -*





43. "coo ' bbora in the rr i-nti After," Foreign
Irs , *pril 1943, p. 524.
.!
Chapter III
u, .- . '.:
i 1
The external .Axis threat to e to
the | % : a continent, was r i ;ised first
im ' I •. Unit- 3 ' ".eh initiated to
': r t on : a: d front. off a;
Included 13 ..tic, military, economic i
mec oy of abich cor f the
feet t) t both Brazilian and U.a, national o s were
oh were i -nod. to stapplai II Axis
activities in Brazil with siaila . . pre . . ""; | aal-
3-3r > proyraraa in which the Axis had not been active, for
example IndXJ .' l/coamerical development by % ''' :.-.,
tier: of health/sanitation programs, and the naoderni-
zation of the Brazilian d forcer oorted. by the
Unit'-- . The "'raziiian rerricnre, i_uth lly flow due
to ( politic 1 r.ituetion, rapid! hered
momentta 11 the i one of 3raz.ll into tb r.
In V;razil, the struggle beta con th ocrv tic forces
and -1st c- —/eloped in favor of tfc< >port©I*9
of democracy. a it was reported on -une la?, 19^1^ that




,, f 1f, r . ^.
os. the -:1 In' at or for .' ;; a o o,




the need for doner U.S. . economic relations,
.'. the refur 1 Of t. How L.^.T.I. to
station a plane tender ne: r -oriha id,
:ned to signify 8 definite trend t fpport of
5
th: . U.S. aircraft had oecn ferried to the
British in th t via Brazil, Th ! Lla£
policy was still not clear a? Condor had opened a new
2
route in Maranhao on the northern coast on June 21.
rly in December, it was announced that this welcome
development reprer the cul. . ,ion of efforts by
Pr .velt to provide assist fc.0 the British
In the most expeditious manner. Ha hi 'uect&d
additional appropriations in to further strengthen
d spheric dei 1,350,000,000 hich
$200,000,000 was an emergency fun , This fund, not only
provi.; ••" ,000,000 to Brazil to t. in puro ing
equipment of the expropriated C n and Italian sir lines,
but it also fin-need the air. "elopm s in un-
4
the a of Pan-American ray».
The airport development pro. ,st far be\ end a
ferryin-. vice as it envisioned the development of at
-i --
.
. -- u4 ef oyin -~r- T^/'i
2
. Ibid
. , p. c- .
3. Conn r child, The ; of scaisecric
Defense
,
Vol. 1, The Western Hemisphere, p. 41.
4. Lawrence Duggan, The . series s: The esrch for demi sphere
3 Com- - ) , p. 85
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s% b cozen land-sea airports on the
ere to become |er 11 In the
1 been in o:er: lion for : t li a
r with " 7 cr oo miction on f of the
airfield; , ©He beJ erfon
pa; le of about thirty cents i .5
"Victory Corridor"
rlcan was responsible for the provision of
ferry crews for the 1610 mile trip across the routh
-.tl ntic froffl Ratal to y-thhurst . Flights to Africa had
been made since October by both Fan- -.rlcan and lend-lease
transports, heavily overloaded ,nd carrying extra gas tank;*
in their cabins to extend their rang* to twelve hours for
the extra involved, in B tr*»S-Atlantic crossing.
Brazil beinr Officially neutral, the flight! were die gnatsad
as a coriinercicl operation, but the crews were -nted
with "retired army perr onnel."y
These flight a via the "victory corridor" were of
inestimable value in support of the war efforts as th
made possible the rebuilding of the British Eighth Aray (
the later reinforcement of U.S. forces in the Philippines
anc , and the emergency supply of items to India/China.
Lif
-
zlne, December 15, 1941.
6. Ibid., p. OJ*.
7. "Brazil: The New Ally/ Fortune , November 1942, p. 107.
8 « Ibid ., p. 107.
.
JOO, &f % - :; -'- ".-1 n : sos
*
: nl in lit relaelo
ling t: trance of Uni ees fore
into Brazilian territory for th
teetion of the vital i on thr IXt* Ui , r-ll




and the rcani tione of the cooperation eouldii't
produce en unfavorable reaction on the int eicel
situation.
The Unit L, of t. I lien
sensitivities, had to develop pi or the introduction
of forcer into ere ell in I :er deviour nor. doveral
approaches were eu^-eeted, amOttg which were plene for the
part toipat ion of United etates army troops in :llian
leuvers in northeastern il and the proposal for the
uce ol :llian troops in Dutch Guiana/Azores, which
would lead to an exchange of Brazilian- icen defense
forces. An additional pb n wae introduced by a colonel
which involved, the use of the United as a
d, First, the eavy would recuest permission to
use the le.ee 1 for patrol planes; the ould
reque. ion for ' tance l~Vf type aircraft
to as.: let in the patrol work; !e.rin r&s *f uld be pro-




requested to replace the- i ine cor- .
lor to the Initiation of
szil : ay, all the pi' roduc- tion
to th. reduction of !. . . force rlne
un: rd fch<S 'fitXfti
before Pearl I sr.
- the wmr pro- ail b rticipent,
the problem of I. r. forces in Brazil resolved itself
the Internal politic:! situation ao longer - concern,
_e the force: 1c cased without ion
or I as t ions, on t' rt of the lly
18 of all servicer. t; bi: reughout the
in of bases with t tarten n& cosraond
center located I aife in p, 194-2. **
Brazil, shortly after the aio Conference in Jan ,
n to er.bark on measure; led to ensure the
- of the b. ir raid precautions a ere placed in
effect in the c OS 1 1 a 1 cities, c one. cript b t ours w er e
lengthened, garrisons on the const vers strong
t
id
General Irtevao Leito de "srvelho we h ced in nd on
12the bulge. Thi considered a definite plus feet or
as he h r verelp repressed Axis activity in tl uth.
Conn ; irchild, The . r: of Heals-
t 2feU*< P* 304*
., p. ~25.
12. 1 r




Fernando de ".;_- ronha was declared federal territ :id
plans were - to fortify It.
n to op .'..-- ft
from the bases at id Recife in April, 194
Arr re completed, concurrently, to la — te
Brazil orce 'F.A.B.) o Mi there of the
U..". Aoh anh need the protect! Hfe for the
bases. *•* Secretary of the ' ? a . ited the three
most Important base** cife .-
,
In October,
194-2, stressed how veil they were equipped ized
the all-out U.S. -Brazilian cooperation. ^
In November, 1942, with the launching •rth-
African offensive, the perehens ion over the security of
the bases was removed thereby enabling closer cooperation
between th r zilians an ieans BO necessary to
continue t" ipport of the common effort against the Axis*
The results of this cooperation enabled the U. S. to pro-
vide for the raintoinence of 165,000 troops in Brazil





One important aspeet of the military cooperation, nrior
to sad during the war, consisted o;r the arming of Brazil, not
13. Conn end Fairon!Id, The . ark of Hemisphere
. 317.
'
. _, Ootobei 10, 1942,
15. __w ra ...y -. . - ?ood '.iQ'j :
'Gainesville, Florida: University of j_or_ 5 Press,




only for hemispheric defence, but for participation in
the & s fighting, n the ' ui nt
rai en from i not fOj in
1°39, t' 115 turned to fcli ftj
altara ta e of : 11 -; , . ei: tinr lepisleeMori and
t o prohibit th I to
, but a1 " lent l : : ' t . a
joint ion !ritt::-an ion), ' ' \ nd
adopted in JtHie, 1?40 which allowed II ' nt
to Ball OOaat defenrc and r nti-ai rorrft punn and
16
munition to the istarioan Rapt&ll©«
.
I decision by
Judg* faoeate general t ct th ' at of
June 5, l°so " - * ' 1# of : lup ©c nt
to "ifn buy era
,
provided a. method for the e •
:
'tion
of tl: ere a /' .s to procure
17
coast< 3 clef > pona
.
ver. in of the lagli lation 11 : " . the
B&loa, ".
'
t the BUld be no introduction
of S ;e weapons in Latin : . Thie '
ceident vrhon ' at ', It Without
consultation, witfc )jp - so it
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22, Lei , odrich ..-" , rroll, eel., locuraents
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Corns id er5.n '- : of t : -y costJ &&-
tion with ':" J£& tit the oorld cm
in] "or I- -rtion
p tine, th- •-••* be tlf.1
11 in the form of •QulpflMH& a iiomitions,
ipla of nor ion.
sitte&ly, t it enefit result of U raa
were - f • ot thct the
In ill Irit of s ( ior
wc- .-. of t curit
of tv B>,
illen 9d former,
p] o~t powerful ' -uth
--rior. : th« foro« occupying fir't r.l ce.
Inst the other &a*rl0&» republics doesn't
reveal the true otren£th of Trail's forcer • a
wcr in which the BO«t powerful firditinr: no chin eo In history
were
The ili-n "37- of:


























i« air force was ooapoead of off
thirty-five hundred men. It lied 1 ed
and f the pilots were In training in the United
The of one hundred thousand




internal order, cut t insufficient for the '
of modern v;ar c~ s or net extern alt,
Thi- recornised bv the Varies r the Initiation
of or" • for e- Gerr no tho:-ice, from the
United
the v/ar drew closer, Pi evident
tc- s Lling Up the rcr-rvv.;, i enlistment? and
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Llor J 1$40« purpose
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t
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The United St -d that i la the full
rt of the Lliana would nee. 13. anfcail a
multitude of problems. In order to obtain the ic
materials v« required and to at -bilii-.e the
economy, technical personnel, ,ured in
the U.7., rails, port facilities and hi i to
be r^rovidedtc 11. r thir reason, seven of nine
principal advla era to Suan e r t Ki o w c e onem i c
41
advieore* ">reover, since *re -bed enormous
deliveries from Brazil, it imperative that I
economic life not be stifled.
Full economic cooperation w t the Rio
Conference with the United agreeing to provide
consumer goods to the in eric n republics on the seme basis
as/own oivlliani in return for their I "imum
a rc ount s of s t r t epi c Ms t eri a 1 s . Ba s i c 1 1y , the United
tea endeavoured to adhere to the agreement, although
shipping and consumer floods short prevented the
carrying out of the full intent of the pledge. Consumer
goods shipments for the period 1°39-1?44 Imoat doubled
rising from 543,000,000 to '1,034,000,000. not taking
42into .-c count price rises due to inflation.
The idea of purely.sing Latin American raw :ia Is,
to assist them and to preclude Asia purchase, originated
41. hbore .a. r," '".- - -noll e.
luary 26, 19*2,
42. Lawrence a, Phe b: Thj rch for




in the Goos j h or policy of Free i. dent Roosevelt in
1-36 at Bontivedeo. . the Idea hod gained to the
extent that the Met; Is Reserve Copper tion was e Sed
to procure rid ship to the U.S. diamonds, mle . rtz
4^5
cr iganese. * In 1°40, President 1 welt
reo.ueeted that priority for purchase of the • ' Is be
44given to Latin American nations.
In Hay 1941, a United State--- . z.ilian ent n
arranged by the Foreign Affairs sinister ie ranha
and U. . b s sad or, Bcffernon Gaffcry through a series
of notes which granted the United States two yeai"
exclusive purchasing right to all Brazilian strategic
materials. All materials not purchased by private companies
would be taken by the Metal Reserve and Rubber Reserve
Gorpor tions at prices agreed upon in advance. ^"5
Joan Raushenbush referred to strategic materiala as
the "sinews of war" pointing out that mica essential
for elect ri ca 1 equlpment , ant lmony for batt eri es/cbemi ca li
,
tungsten for high speed tool steel and quarts cr t Is for
46
radios. Large amounts of zirconium, used in blasting
caps, and beryllium for alio;- steels, urgently needed,
43. The Sew York Time?? , February 15, 1S43.
44. "czer, Are Be Good Neighbors ? p. 77.
45. Fan-, merlcan Union Bulletin , Bovember, 1941, p. 670.
46. Joan Birbenbush, "Look At LetIn America," (Be*/; York:
Foreign T:olicy . d'ociation





were also supplied b; L« • efore th :, these
purely res ha. a for politloal reasons, but ft
the war bad begun, Brazil bea ae the cru ource of
»ply,
The aforementioned bs sure i Bbst; nt3 lly ided the
global mlliter3 effort of the alliea i -il, one of
the most important supply centers-, virtually immune
to interference as the war progress ed.
Industrial ' -lonment :nd :pri cultural rivvr"ific ,--t.lon
Ancillary too, but exceedingly important in the
economic sphere timulatlon of the development of
JJ o Industry and agricultural production. ,;oao
Alberto Lins rros, the most powerful aan next to
occupied the post of Economic Coord in- tor, a
4ftposition similar to that held n, Is on A, Pockefeller.
As econor.ic coordinator, hi a function r .edlte the
development, procurement and rhipment of all materials to
the United State** To this end, he formulated specific
plans to increase the supply of Bias and quarts crystals,
boost rubber production in the .Amazon to 120,000-150,000
tons within two -.ears, exploit oil re ervaa to supply
allied ships, and increase steel plate/beuxite shipments.**
47. Prepared by the Coordinator of Inter- "ric-n fcffairs,
Cur aacricrn ieiphbors
,
r shinrton, D.C., Public
ffairs
- real, 1?45), pp. 54-55.
48. Fredria del Vellar, 111as a o," The Inter-
American
.
April, 19*3, p« 16.
49. The Inter-.' •.;.-; erl can , March, 1943, p. 42,

;e of th€ iticus projects if
ex ' inere - o la rubber production,
or' ' -kefellry
of oon oral c , the rub! on a
?
.re in %\ on, n
tanee minister § Dr. - rthu.r " uraent
"They've forgotten hov; bir t' n i on
it ir."50
vertheless, :" . .^h,
2 under which t azllian Gove 1 nd
ported thousand! of workon to the in to
become rubber worlrer
.
e vanguard of the 80,000 assigned
workers didn't leave for the Aaastjft until February, 1943,
The expenses of the project were jointly financed by the
Brazilians zn<3 United States as was the J y Health
project C: 5 ,ooo, ooo) r. ary t In the worken in
the hostile environment .^ Production of rubber increased
to some extent | but never "ic reach the original target
figures an the difficulties of collecting the product from
trees growing wild were grossly under- ~ted.
.e focal point for the industrial development of
Brazil was the Vclto Redonda iron and steel plant. Brazil
had iron ore, nam e and limestone in KlRftfl derail in
50. "Brazil] The Bow ally/ : crtune . November, 1~,; ,
51. Kurkland, current ::i story
. February, 19*3, p. 523.
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addition to coal in lm .
.ch m led h t : to
for furnancer , coke ovens, ana" r . ilr rt of the
United Stat ©nt for
hump. Additionally, 14,000,000 in credit was grantei
to Bra&lX b the Export- Import to pay for r: -lire
construction to open up the Itaira iron mines,
DM United '-totes reluctance tc rk on the
venture, cue to the lack of plant equipment
,
?t
war. : necessity in order that nationalisl itary
officer-, opposing the decision of V - concur in
the use of Brazilian soil by for f«yea* # 3* The
increased production throughout th> td the surmount*
of the reographioal difficulties incurred in transporting
coal 720 miles from Santa Catarina while bringing iron ore
100 miles from Itabira (the worlds largest high grade iron
ore reserve), wa?- proof of the industri. 1 effl&nct ' Wk of
Brazil.
Financial ;• easures
Financial measures in support of economic cooperation,
in addition to loans and grants for development end public
works projects, provided for stabilization of the
currency. The Unite-" even went to the extent of
52. John -.". . Johnson, politic: 1 - ' -rlc





shi pp.- nknotes by eir tc il to allevi-
53
uirrency shortage after a previous shipment had been sunk,
r#a to il included the Inter-
American Coffee sting Agreement d to prevent
petition lee decline. ?". ed
the Unit- the exporting count ri<
que .th the .>r.crlQ(.n conr to
add to i income. Quotas were alee ad on
ptitrtS to the U.J. from iion-~ oriet: along with
prlati suree to finanea storage of bui in
*tl«5* Tale agreeaon* wai ueeee he Brazilian
viewpoint end the cost to the ' ,. . -a. ' Jer Ir ,t
.
Shlpplnr a.-Turac
Shipping faeiliti. anted another problem in the
iport of economic cooperation for as the va.r continued,
foreign flag veeseli were incro withdraws fr
service. nit eel tried t short
diverting aere *• la to trade with the ., or tern here,
utilisation of prioritie- tafetag of Axil ships
in American ports after commencement of the va r. The
number of U,£. flag vo^rels in intra, rier-e tr- oe
doubled between June, 1 her, 1C4-0.
53. Harry "«
,
"The Klepenio iUaerieaa oecord,"
Current History
. Se] mr, 1942, p. 242.
54. John DeWllde, ' ; art! onomic cooperation in the
'ioas , " Foreign Policy Reports . February , 1 942
,
. 2C0.
55. Ibid ., p. 244.
la.
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In short , i II of those i : Lusi \M . .






a tC ... in 1 ' .
.
ic
ot of the mission outlined in
it in
1. _ of
ts«ntial products, ' %Xy those
; .:




2. convert 111*8 industry to tho use
supplier. Originally imported.
3 . 1nt ... in an d. i :::r)rove t r« n fl p ort fa c i 1 it i 6 .
4. Lay the foundation for l lonn-r? nre
econo .
>-ris L. Cooke, the her-d of the U.S. Technic 1
6 been tho former hood of tho Rural Electri-
fication . 0: inir tr tion and a consultant ot the war
product i on bo- re1 .
56. The Hop Vor-1: Tir r , Gepteber 3, 19h2 .

The work ' • ' 11;. to
: whol« sllisa econo* ine tl •'
"
1 1 es
correct them with view






cor purs un ace of tb* :;— S hfc
into tfc of la*; ening t! p on t".
nomy of fited 1 artlc .
?cli;igai.
' r'i rty
•'.he v: a, it Wt
in tb< re that the Good neighbor "clic W*8 /oing
to unci ergo a crucial tert. ether
icerninr the fifth column re, ootb




ment of the - '. ary Committee on relit icl
re and the recommendation to break diplomatic and
economic relatione with the AJrli at •-*.© in
Jar
,
1942. were enjoined. lition XVII
to meet t: -oliti by \?ocr ' ed
158
The organization to supervise this
57. d-crrir: IdU n Cooke, .br: :.:::il on d; . - h-.. r'cuay





1°4 A ) , p . 13
.
58. rl Lowens*tein, "Pan-American!en in Action," durrent
Ulstor;;
.
NOV ember, 19*3 1 p. 229.
, to I
67




offlc • j not r ented on t §*
It ke" continuous watch over energy prop s,
to be
adopted to ::ie Infiltration from abroad 6
control the fifth column st home. , it
had roc on:; r twenty- on been placed
into 3 ion by oil tl - . rgtBtin*
.
provided for control of J J -nr 7 -re-
vent ion o mm of citizenrhip. 1 ontrol of
-el cere ftps Slid th bectlor. of
ip and siliti as.
The ant1~Fascist drive --ted in Brass!1 without
LiiaC I"" r • lutio 'o for the curtailment of
Axis | ' Ity. Tr- took the firrt BSasu*
of t th* " ' the constitution
to permit tl 1-ure oj r« rty in order to provf
n for 1 involved in ship sinkings. The
23 f861 ton Italian liner, sontc td#, taken over for the
duro t i on of the i rs r ira ? toe 'Or int re - s Ot a t a 1 b i*a d e
plan 3 in the of: i ng to turn the " to
tcin, " lam li ton," Cur: cnt
,.-
T ,ovc:vbcr. 19*3, . 30.


















onl; I • azil,
An Li of I " i
% %\ ileion lent
tltud* of facto;
Big Lent to t
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the r in fever of , in th








oubt as to which sich
J or, or if ?•.!.. l














the north ;ruo in bl h. ve
seemed to I
. I I
liee. if the decision h-: c to b- . But oven to
De- r 7, 1941, Var$i 111 un I Mil
63
pi; utiou« l refu
•e in till
dubious la he fin 3 --op, but --. .. cd in the
63 • "' ort Herring,
;
ric n




ort the Alii . p&i i Q ed
during the after Rio, it fin
ere t, .. a v so*uld
ov.~
It ion belli/
', o it were ' 'he
\ r !i .the
v?er lti fourth
October 26, 191? « The United r
cntbe earlier end '
t sinkings, ive contri
primarily Of food ru- - and 3 foi -<= to
patrol t h
'
ice or- 1 1
.
In 1042, tV j I " third • ' -
-red eight month revoca-
tion war the -- mo,
e enl- r divergence bet 1 t
in 1917, Congr< b
,
- in l n/: 2,
made the I on in tfa« je of a i ne
received cab! ] al,
Tr.
•
r, for Brazil, -er relatively
slow, rer breaking off rolatie Ltl idi
Jar : Germans, in repriceIf -.unk ievej
Brazili B . On March 11, 1942, the fourth tllaa
64, heric '"nit Allj
r,
"
;; j- . 31, 1942 .

71
ship (5,152 ton SajrrnJ unk with the loss of flft
nine lives* -1 deraostratio
tock .-.- in r io fi< &eirO with the d or®
urging dona the Rua Do Ouvidor, the fifth :. venue of the
it-1, wj n shops, burning boe;
"Down ' itfa It lor. : '
On ; rch 23, 1 : lian
ship, u ate n: l< for whieh
ll cued.
In the log bh« ok- ;aent
of war ! zil, tt dps were sunk with the 1 of
600 lives inclu ' of 1
gift
transport, w< • ! int,for
the angry populace filled V, rests of the major citi
*31n£ war
«
On August 21st, bonfires of *p-z% fl r r ing
on the st epc of the municipal theatre
on the palaoe lawn. In
crowd ttatads "The : bol of liberty • rid a nation
that does not protect its If no- to live."gq
65. :t Carl oca Bonflx , oek
.
I. rch £3 f 1 Q4 .
66 « IM_-> P* 32.
67. The New 'crk rimes
,
. 1; 4, 19*2,
68. Life ::-:•: -ine , & BT 7, 194-2.







te of belli d on
inn ster of ice
to the proud tradition of 1 in never declar: . on
• on. Italy m i incli.
int with .' 'ncluded be
of the potential \ I of the I i the
count ry nd th« »r Chile with a lor
71
undefended coastline.
It t't until President -sued 8 decree on
June 6, 19*5 that
72
last n. time, it . ed on
or the other insofar as J ilted d.
It appear* that the fii Lon to c r
wa od an inordin. nount of tj .
were very eing ; bion of




President ! hod wielded an e>:tr
against the Axis minorities in the period he
war, even to the extent of t bitutlonal
guarantees. He broke off dl tic r ' ona in 1942,
70. "Brazil: fhe lly," Fortune, ,212,
71. The ^e-v ork Times , August , 194:.
72. Leland . . rroll. ed., its
on .iiTieric-n 1'Oreip-n Relations : «iuly, 1944 - June, 1?45
,















;?erence to U I lifttl
marin Itorialj. rig th
not t of tnr, but a legit ii
74
org nined pir
./h there so • tent 1
ft be ! • i,




It was a irrupt the
normal tj nnelc for
which might rove to have dii ic repercusa ions
once the wt r was over, , cultural I re olo
73. ...eo, Tt 19* ,















Africa red to b< t r- on I :,ion.
knew that the Brazilian ad force re of Irieuff icie-
st renr-th to c ith a direct external atl Ing
with int d rebellion.
Hit; :
of influence ov ' ons of the
• 'Lstr Lion, t
h their sudden victories
lipotence, they th vor tfc
The fled to be pro- rcJ xl
little in the way of influence .75 fkey were
reluct ant to act in concert th the IV. ,: \/ - j: : likely
convinced President eise eautic fell the
outce no 1c abt
.
the war t I ricult1
to
reduce the e: hile the ic
difficult 1 ere resolved to tion by
the .-. ction at lo by the 0« . promise to
ted*
75. - eler, ut the





Concurrent with the reluctance to become involved,
wer store which served to pro ,n
affirmative decision for :it to the .allies.
loll lly, the iiubmarine action led directly to the
belli rerenc;y, but the sinkin been Cm for
period of month . -over, Brazilian nation d
been mlstr in German occupied France.
'
The basic reasons for deciding on war were probably
a combination of the following:
1. elose Brazil! an- United m relations
cooperation had been fostered
rras :lt e the pr— of ideo-
1 Og i c 1 era ct i ca 1 d i j i c es .
2. Sumner ellei refused to react hasti
to the ch concemin iclst
tendencies in Brasll« rved to
support a friendly relationshi \ch
in turn undoubtedly contributed to t he-
notion held by Var the long-range
interests of Brazil were intertwined with
those of the United States.
3. Once President /arras became convinced of
lied victory, the only logical step
- to cement the politic:. 1 and economic
cooperation with the strongest of all ties,
military e©operation.««
4. The B1111 , ~h for the most
part Pro- reluctant te wind up
on the loi side. As th< progi d,
the out co- a inevitable therefore forcing
a oh: nee to support of the Oni
5. The people of Brazil supported a war
la r^t ion ; nifested thi port by
anomic action throughout il in prot t
aInst the shipping losses. I consider this
to be a decisive factor.
76. The dew or:: Ti:w \ ust 23, 194 .
77. Current History , Vol. 3, September, 1942| p. 159,
:
76
6. ionalist ic ,he
Brazilian aalllt tlaee.
If In the war on
the sice of %) 1 1 lei b aul 6 be
in • ^ in the
peace 'ictorlous nation.
The Minister of Foreign Affair? h ad on
t 1st, (before announcement of the decision for war)
that ilian tre b
I
. VQ if the need
r-tO
arose. ilian troops abroad would increase enormously
the 11 throughout Latin . In
addition, the ©quipm©»t would be supplied by the United
State ich wcul ble Brazil : -come the
millt r on the scue. ericas continent. \ the
basis of i celculated risk, tl -ected r^ine from
ft htinr- the Axis were sure to far exceed the lo-
in summary, the policy decision to become an active
military participant in VforId War Two " . S« only after
a lengthy period of analysis durinr which the economic,
military and political facets influencin. I an
were considered. The decision, of course, was a politic:
one made by an extremely competent politician with
ad-v that are still accruing to Brazil.
75. ^rthur ?. Whiteker, ed., Inter-.^ erican ^ftzin
.






• edit ion . se
he genesis of the Hi .it ion orce
•rob bly A of the cor- n
ul; , l-4i. pp< at Rooseve]
d with the tare- ' 1 to
rt leipate in foil I Lit srOur to protect the
he,. •-.. ore by occupying Dutch Guiana or v. sores if the
3
need are e, .hough approved by \;
,
no cot ion v
forthcoming. A second propoi w&Xi
troops to Puerto Kico was never e::ocu' ue to technical
difficult:, iich caused the . . rales
2to oppose the plan.
the
,
the mill ©seed a dec ire to
become an setlvs partio.' , over ven w
I
independent set ion against r In the Fail o:
Thi
.
-etoed by the I e Department on .unds
that if Brazil sent forces ovc 9, other Latin lie: n
3troops ••.vould to be sent and th oren't trained.
Ch Janu/ 0, 1 • ; , e , oinfc d :. e co-mission for
rtheast il reco:;:. it of a
1. . tt 8. i ho Und.c. -.y red.
rothers, l*'!53) t p. 5^8.








three infantry &iY. Ivlslon, :en



























feme , ' . ;'• 7,
5. 1 "ork 30, 1943
«
6 » tt», ed., \o:'.cc 3-1^4 ,
re v . p. 3
tod
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Th' Times of January 30, 1043 report eel
the evenly ^ting at consf- the joint
lian effort. It Is likely that
die 1 at th« ting ad 1 outline of H
formulated*
pril, 19^3, President Var; Iho
pT* a for a four- ion • force which
wa
B
roved In principal b 1,
it developed envi-ja i units would
serve under the high 3 of the Unite
fol ic direct ion.
7
the tiV« fo-; It lOll
and d fully armed 2>&em equipment,
th"5 lot the c ! . Pore
would, to depend upon the . . ' on arriv 1
in the o«r< re ©as t re of
the plana 00 . .F., the Bra si lian
Lnister of - eat to the U#S, to "or th ining
of 1,500 allot?: reorultittg pped TJp.8
Brigadier C turned from /'-fries after
-ahower and predicted tfc razlllan roldiers,
irmen would fight ol G Mil en in the





















1^3 : J •• - Qftf
ter-r
,
loan . 't , 19*3, B. ! .















ttle exigencies, to bring ti
Italy,




.1 G . I . ' s
rlv&l la
worn b; hi oh ©on
intervened arOun .' _ 1 ^c.
The i i opted in r- ;. it
on il % into
ailii oi'll cobra
12. . .ill, lQ6l.:i
:
"or If' "r , (Boston: Houphton r.ifflin ::,1),
7
13. ily 24, 1944.
-
' 1 thia :ol of







Thl , .F., .. ved with hif" lowing why
they were in Italy, :r for acti >d to
the Fifth Army of Gene: • n coastal
area which had be. ulet during -.he I-
cedi:. „ ,/er, it n't until Zaptc 15th
that : moved i he li.- • the
end of a before the , ;j&
16
into the -fcr to pattern. - Llied
force: ituat^d on a line runn' lea, throu-
Florence and thence to a point jv .„ he
zi linns were amimed to the job of holding ;,he left
flank of the allied line which in the area NO^h of
Pisa on the coapt. Shortly thereafter, an offensive wi
t^o bpoaoh the Gothic Line which had been oetabllsl
14
.
r 3 , 1 :i '- 5 •
!5. Ihe ::e- "T-k Hi:--.
,
25, 1944,
16. . Of t: , t,
and King .
': J. I?. Li-incott, 1-47), r>, 1^3.
•
S3
by the Germans as a last ditch defensive position in
Italy* Although the II penet rated after three
months of fighting, % member, 1944. the
was forced to suspend plans for a drive on Bologna due
to pressure on the v- n flank, ( stof), ?nd.
withdrawal of British units on the east-.: ot
oliticrl c -ce.*^
tn ;. ion e t e wtat
-
d to
.11 ccvamev in I ntcr.
wei of the tg off en r ' on
ii. rll 5th, , r in It.-. 1th
the i rfci&tions for surrender
Germane which resulted in their oapitulation on . 1)45. °
The Brazil! / rce returned to Brazil on
July 19, 1945 to be welcoroed by thou 1 of one
bene-front supporter! .
to just <: the
militcr role of the .... : in Italy, and. whether or
not the consensus 1 ding that role is in ive of the
actual contributions to the Allied victory in the
Kedit I it lone,
To ani tions required th veral
17. General of tJh . tall, ,'iiirc ort 9
oortr- of rrh. 11, /mold an-" !iry
,
. j. Lippincott, 1?47), p, 173.
iQ- Ihid .. p. 176.
'!
asp of the rail: n tion be c R>r
exi
. .
the Involved in Italy, the time element
^ once, not to t h rrival departure of the
. . . b to aignifioi
the int '.. in b< , :h ie
to : in . Lng of the
ro3 , . . . the under consS
ook, A i_ | : j | ory
of th. -• - . . : -tes 0< ling th .. ... as
foi:
"thej ei d in heroic c on the




t in i r
in or:
. ... :..n
divirion to surrender. a lA8tB
Infant rj :.ivi". .: to the
.
" '




types and A, 000 horseigo
1 disc n be iraniec': Ly noted* rirst
anc3 foremost, it ie e;:teniel; unlike division,
even if of the same c:. liber as that of an < *ent&, can
compel surrender of an o ng division, particularly




i, 1955), P. 778.
20. Th; Oj 1°A5.

one on the deSe . It lg generally accept




to- one ' "ul defena. \y foe
- rlfcrlty.




unit. >• . . . hi rived In Iti
trcin-' It, but ion of a report, concerning their
or trainln - m %n -1
inc"- : received w virtu
22ins of, -
n, th- bad M
training '
.
d t o a of




r until th . n ox-
was
it •;/" •
durir inter, so fi is,
the total to bout four : . The
21, , __"_:.




, 1 ^56 ) , p . 2 16
.
22. .Mo, :... . >roeg, leal 3ectien,
orb of ',:.. "- '. , .-.. .:,:• i on
:-.ditlon<. ry r or per in th c It o lien G nr-r ion from
~ly 16, 1 "44 to the C'— cot ion of JTo: : tilit'ios in lis;/
,
fJ-5," or. lc in the Office of
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